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NOTE
Understanding and Regulating Twenty-First
Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study
Marcel T. Rosner* & Andrew Kang**
Ripple is an open-source Internet software that enables users to conduct pay-
ments across national boundaries in multiple currencies as seamlessly as send-
ing an email. This decentralized Internet payment protocol could provide a
cure to an inefficient cross-border payments system. Although Ripple’s tech-
nology can reduce significant risks and costs that exist in the international-
payments system, regulators should adopt a new regulatory framework that
responds to how this technology works. This Note performs two functions to
help regulators realize this goal. It first helps regulators and other market par-
ticipants understand how Ripple operates by explaining what Ripple is and
comparing it to current payments systems. Second, it suggests a series of prin-
ciples that regulators should use to monitor decentralized Internet payment
protocols like Ripple. It does this by drawing from and tailoring existing regu-
latory principles to account for the risks reduced and presented by Ripple.
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Introduction
Joe lives in a rural town in the United States and has an account with a
small bank, AmeriBank. Joe wants to pay $100 to Mary, who lives in a small
town in India and has an account with another small bank, IndiaBank. How
does that $100 get to Mary, and what will it cost Joe? First, it moves from
AmeriBank, through the Federal Reserve, to a large New York bank that has
a contractual relationship with a large Delhi-based bank. Then, it moves
from the New York bank across national borders to the Delhi bank. Finally,
it moves from the Delhi bank through the Reserve Bank of India, and to
IndiaBank. The ultimate transaction between Joe and Mary occurred
through three separate settlements, and at each point in the transmission of
the transaction and at each settlement point, the bank earns a fee. But what
if Joe and Mary could complete the transaction in a single step?
Ripple is an open-source Internet software that enables users to conduct
payments across national boundaries in multiple currencies as seamlessly as
sending an email.1 Created by Ripple Labs, Inc. (“Ripple Labs”) in 2012, this
software is embedded with a protocol that dictates how Ripple-connected
computers interact with each other.2 This protocol uses a distributed
ledger—a collection of financial accounts updated by numerous and dis-
persed entities—through which Ripple users can conduct cross-border pay-
ments in a way that is faster, less costly, and more efficient than traditional
means.3
1. Phillip Rapoport et al., Ripple Labs Inc., The Ripple Protocol: A Deep Dive
for Finance Professionals 4, 45 (2014) [hereinafter The Ripple Protocol].
2. Id. at 4. “Ripple Labs” has since dropped “Labs” from its name. Alec Liu, A New
Chapter for Ripple, Ripple (Oct. 6, 2015), https://ripple.com/blog/a-new-chapter-for-ripple/
[http://perma.cc/4R8A-9CT6]. To help distinguish between the protocol and the company
largely behind it, this Note refers to the company as Ripple Labs.
3. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1 at 4–5, 13.
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Today’s international-payments system is broken, and Ripple could pro-
vide its cure. The international-payments system lacks transparency and re-
mains antiquated, “slow, inconvenient, [and] costly.”4 Thus the Federal
Reserve, in proposing reforms to the U.S. payment system, listed the ability
of “[United States] consumers and businesses to send and receive conve-
nient, cost-effective and timely cross-border payments” as one of five desired
outcomes to improve the modern payment system infrastructure.5 And
while the Federal Reserve has identified the problem, private banks believe
that distributed ledger technology could provide the solution. Santander
Bank estimates that distributed ledger technologies could save banks up to
$20 billion a year in infrastructure costs related to cross-border payments,
securities trading, and compliance.6 This Note argues that Ripple provides
the solution that the Federal Reserve calls for by offering a more efficient
and secure way to send money across borders than traditional systems.
This Note suggests that Ripple should and will become widely adopted,
serving as at least one major international-payments protocol. But if Ripple
is widely adopted in the global-payments ecosystem, regulators must figure
out the best way to oversee its use. This poses challenges because, unlike
traditional payment systems, Ripple is an open-source Internet protocol: it is
not owned or operated by any entity, but it facilitates operational processes
between its members.7 And although it governs how the users’ computers
interact with each other, the protocol does not affect the users’ legal rights
and obligations.8 Ripple does not propose to replace the current financial
infrastructure, but instead intends to become a part of it, much like an app
on an iPhone.9 Ripple provides the rail on which payments move; it does not
define any other aspect of the relationships of its users or their legal respon-
sibilities to one another.10 Because of its decentralized nature and unclear
legal status, Ripple—like other distributed ledger-based protocols—does not
fit into existing frameworks for regulating payment systems or service
providers.
This Note first helps regulators and other market participants under-
stand how Ripple operates. It then suggests principles that regulators might
use to monitor these increasingly important decentralized and globalized
value transmitters. Part I explains how traditional payment systems work
4. Fed. Reserve Sys., Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System 25 n.35
(2015), https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-
payment-system.pdf [http://perma.cc/42U7-EVVS].
5. Id. at 2. The other improvements focus on speed, efficiency, and security improve-
ments. Id.
6. Santander InnoVentures et al., The Fintech 2.0 Paper: Rebooting Financial
Services 15 (2015).
7. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 4.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 4–5.
10. Telephone Interview with Ryan Zagone, Dir. of Regulatory Relations, Ripple Labs,
Inc. (Apr. 20, 2015).
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and the particularly significant problems and costs that attend people’s abil-
ity to send money throughout the world. Part II argues that Ripple provides
a better way to make cross-border payments because it makes international
payments cheaper, more efficient, and more secure. Part II also explains Rip-
ple’s unusual governance structure and analyzes how regulators currently
require financial institutions to manage Ripple (rather than regulating Rip-
ple itself). Part III provides substantive suggestions for regulating Ripple and
other decentralized Internet-payment protocols (DIPPs). It analyzes domes-
tic and international guidelines and regulations and modifies them to ac-
count for the particular risks posed and mitigated by Ripple.
I. Noncash Payments: Moving Money Through Settlement
This Part describes the basic characteristics of traditional centralized
payment systems to explain how Ripple works. To do this, it analyzes how
money “moves” through financial institutions. It then describes how mod-
ern domestic-payment systems rely on central institutions to facilitate this
movement of money between institutions. Because no central institution
provides global settlement functions,11 the current international system is
inefficient and introduces considerable risks to the global financial system.
A. Moving Money in the United States
At the most basic level, payment systems move money from a payer to a
payee.12 While one might think of money as physical banknotes, most pay-
ment systems today move money in the form of deposit balances held in
banks.13 A bank customer creates a deposit balance when she deposits cash
into her account.14 This deposit balance is a financial asset and a form of
money because it reflects a depositor’s claim on the bank that the depositor
can redeem from that bank.15 A noncash payment from a payer to a payee
uses these deposits to “move” money from the payer’s bank account to the
payee’s bank account by decreasing the payer’s deposit balance account and
increasing the payee’s deposit balance account.16 This process is a “settle-
ment” because it settles a payment obligation by moving a financial asset, a
deposit balance, between a payer and a payee.17
11. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
12. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys., Bank for Int’l Settlements, A Glos-
sary of Terms Used in Payments and Settlement Systems 38 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter
Glossary], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/glossary_030301.pdf [http://perma.cc/KB7G-7VCP] (de-
fining “payment systems”).
13. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys., Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Role
of Central Bank Money in Payment Systems 1–2 (2003) [hereinafter Central Bank
Money], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d55.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6E9-624T].




17. Id. at 9–10.
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Settlement occurs when banks update their ledgers to adjust deposit bal-
ances.18 Because settling an obligation between a payer and a payee necessa-
rily creates a new obligation between the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank,
the banks must also settle the transaction between them. To accomplish this
interbranch settlement, the payer’s bank must send a corresponding amount
of funds to the payee’s bank.19 For every credit there must be a correspond-
ing debit: both banks have to update their ledgers to account for the transfer
of funds.20
A “payment system” provides the protocol that defines how banks settle
these obligations.21 More specifically, a payment system is a set of instru-
ments, procedures, and rules that govern the transfer of funds from one
bank to another to settle their obligations.22 A payment system, then, defines
interbank settlement behavior. It defines the processes through which
money moves.
Most modern payment systems rely on a central “settlement institu-
tion,” which holds deposits from each bank that is a party to a payment so it
can settle obligations between banks.23 By adjusting the deposit balances of
the payer’s and payee’s respective banks,24 the settlement institution provides
the key mechanism to facilitate a fund transfer.25 These deposit balances,
called “settlement assets,” provide the funds necessary to balance out the
adjustment of liabilities that arise when a payer pays a payee.26 Most of the
time, the settlement institution is a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve
in the United States.27 And because the Federal Reserve requires every mem-
ber bank to deposit a minimum reserve balance, it can enable the free flow
of settlement between many different banks.28
For example, imagine that Joe wants to pay Mary $100. Each holds an
account with different banks, Blue Bank and Yellow Bank, which in turn
18. Glossary, supra note 12, at 45. A “general ledger,” which most banks maintain for
accounting purposes, provides a record of every financial transaction into which the institu-
tion enters. General Ledger, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/general-
ledger.asp [http://perma.cc/J5NT-9DE5].
19. Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 9–10.
20. See id.
21. See Glossary, supra note 12, at 38 (defining a payment system as “a set of instru-
ments, banking procedures and, typically, interbank funds transfer systems that ensure the
circulation of money”).
22. Id.
23. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 2; Glossary supra note 12, at 45 (de-
fining “settlement institution”).
24. See Glossary, supra note 12, at 45 (defining “settlement”).
25. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 9–10.
26. See Glossary, supra note 12, at 45 (defining “settlement assets”).
27. See id.; Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 2; Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve System: Purposes & Functions 34–35 (9th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter Purposes & Functions], http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D2H3-V66Q].
28. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 35.
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both hold deposit accounts with the Federal Reserve. When Joe initiates the
payment, Blue Bank debits $100 from his account, which decreases the lia-
bility it owes Joe by $100. Blue Bank then instructs the Federal Reserve to
decrease its deposit balance by $100 and increase Yellow Bank’s balance by
$100, which requires both Blue Bank and the Federal Reserve to update their
own ledgers. Through this process, Blue Bank transfers a $100 settlement
asset, in the form of Federal Reserve deposit balance, to Yellow Bank. Be-
cause its assets increased by $100, Yellow Bank can credit Mary’s account by
$100, increasing its liability to Mary and thus balancing its ledger.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve operates two systems to facili-
tate settlement: the Automated Clearing House (ACH), for retail payments,29
and FedWire, for “large-value, time-critical payments.”30 While FedWire
provides near real-time settlement, ACH transactions require one to two
days to settle.31 Although FedWire settles significantly more transactions in
dollar amounts than the ACH, the ACH processed 21.7 billion transactions
in 2012 compared to FedWire’s 287.5 million transactions.32 The Federal
Reserve uses software to update its ledger to process batches of payment
orders between two banks and to calculate net balances.33 Although process-
ing payments in batches and netting final balances is more efficient than
updating the ledger after each transaction, the one- to two-day settlement
process is slow.34
It is hard to imagine a more financially stable institution than the Fed-
eral Reserve, but any payment system that depends on a central settlement
institution creates risks and inefficiencies. Because settlement takes place on
29. Id. at 93–95. ACH is an operational system that facilitates “clearing.” See 2 Comm. on
Payment & Settlement Sys., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Payment, Clearing & Settle-
ment Systems in the CPSS Countries 493 (2012) [hereinafter CPSS on Int’l Payment
Systems], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105.pdf [http://perma.cc/J5BG-WQPS]. In the ACH
system, the Federal Reserve (the settlement institution) serves as an ACH operator and runs a
centralized application software that processes interbank payments. See id. The Electronics
Payment Network (EPN) is a private entity that also operates ACH. Id.
30. Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 94–95. The Clearing House Payments
Company L.L.C., which operates EPN, also operates Clearing House Interbank Payments Sys-
tem (CHIPS). CPSS on Int’l Payment Systems, supra note 29, at 488. CHIPS provides real-
time settlement for large value transfers to approximately fifty American banks that meet de-
tailed requirements in CHIPS’s rules. See id. at 488–89. To facilitate this real-time settlement,
CHIPS relies on central settlement institutions—the Clearing House Payments Company and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—to hold prefunded balance accounts. Id.
31. Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 94.
32. Fed. Reserve Sys., The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study 42–44 (2014),
https://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/general/2013_fed_res_paymt_study_de
tailed_rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/S42D-AHDZ].
33. See id. For example, if Blue Bank and Yellow Bank conducted another payment, in
addition to Joe and Mary’s, in which Yellow Bank transferred $150 to Blue Bank, the ACH
operator would net the two transactions and figure out that the net transfer should be $50 to
Blue Bank.
34. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 93–95.
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the settlement institution’s books, both paying and receiving banks need ac-
counts with that institution.35 To transfer any funds, then, both banks de-
pend on the settlement institution’s operational soundness.36 This
dependence on a central institution to facilitate money transfers magnifies
the operational risk of the settlement institution failing to settle funds.37 And
while the U.S. government backs the Federal Reserve, which in turn guaran-
tees payments made on FedWire,38 the Federal Reserve is not immune from
technological and other operational risks,39 even though the United States’
payment system depends on its sound functioning.
The Federal Reserve also plays a central role in American payment sys-
tems because it helps reduce many risks associated with the use of settlement
institutions. Ordinary settlement institutions may present credit risks, which
exist if the settlement institution relies on credit to facilitate transactions.40 If
the settlement institution cannot settle an obligation, it may expose a payer’s
bank to the risk that its transaction will not process, potentially causing it to
lose the value of the transferred money.41 The Federal Reserve does not op-
erate on credit, however, because the U.S. government funds it.42 A settle-
ment institution may also face liquidity risk, or the risk that it lacks funds to
make immediate payments to meet the claims of depositors.43 But liquidity
problems are not a real risk for a central bank, like the Federal Reserve,
which prints the currency in which it operates and through which it facili-
tates fund transfers.44 Thus most—although by no means all—payment sys-
tems settle through central banks, which eliminate credit and liquidity risk
at perhaps the payment system’s most fragile point, where exposures are
“highest and most concentrated.”45 “The widespread use of central bank
money as a settlement asset reflects its overall qualities of safety, availability,
efficiency, neutrality and finality.”46
35. Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 9–10; see also Glossary, supra note 12, at
45.
36. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 10.
37. See id.
38. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 95.
39. See, e.g., Priya Anand, St. Louis Federal Reserve Confirms Hack, MarketWatch (May
18, 2015, 6:57 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/st-louis-federal-reserve-confirms-
hack-2015-05-18 [http://perma.cc/V2HQ-5C6X].
40. Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 11.
41. Id.; see also Glossary, supra note 12, at 17.
42. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 85–86; Central Bank Money, supra
note 13, at 11–13.
43. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 11–13. Thus the Federal Reserve is
immune from the most significant risk that a settlement institution can face because it can
create its own liquidity.
44. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 85; Central Bank Money, supra note
13, at 13.
45. Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 11–12.
46. Id. at 2.
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On an operational level, domestic settlements between banks involve
nothing more than an adjustment of deposit balances by the settlement in-
stitution. While each bank must ultimately update its own ledger, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s updating and maintaining a central ledger greatly enhances
efficiency and mitigates risk. As the next Section details, cross-border pay-
ment systems do not have a central settlement institution and thus are more
inefficient and risky.
B. The Complexity, Risk, and Expense of the Current
Cross-Border Payments System
Cross-border payments are more complicated to process and present
more risks than domestic payments because there is no global central settle-
ment institution that holds the accounts of banks across national borders.47
In other words, there is no global settlement asset that allows banks to trans-
fer funds across borders because there is no process or institution like a
global central bank that could update its ledger. This is because cross-border
payments require settlement in multiple currencies and thus depend on a
foreign-exchange (FX) transaction.48
Instead of a central settlement institution, cross-border payment sys-
tems rely on an interbank correspondent-banking system.49 This system
processes cross-border payments through international correspondent-
banking agreements that link together domestic-payment systems.50 An in-
ternational correspondent-banking relationship is a contractual arrange-
ment under which a bank in one jurisdiction (a correspondent) holds
deposits, denominated in its native currency, but owned by a bank in an-
other jurisdiction (a respondent).51
Most cross-border payments involve two banks that do not have a corre-
spondent-banking relationship with each other.52 So, many payments must
move through a domestic settlement institution before reaching a corre-
spondent through which it can cross a border.53 This process is relatively
47. See id. at 3, 37–38.
48. Cf. id. at 25, 37-38, 43 (describing the ways in which the development of the CLS
Bank addresses risks in foreign-exchange transactions).
49. See id. at 5, 25.
50. See id. at 11.
51. Glossary, supra note 12, at 16.
52. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 11. Negotiating individual contracts
with international banks that may be that bank’s counterparty involves high transaction costs
that may not be justifiable to smaller financial institutions. See William R. White, International
Agreements in the Area of Banking and Finance: Accomplishments and Outstanding Issues 8–10
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 38, 1996) (explaining that these agreements are
driven by private sector agents and that accounting for changes via contract can be expensive).
53. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Feasibility of a Cross-Border Electronic Funds
Transfer Reporting System Under the Bank Secrecy Act 56 n.41 (2006) (“Most com-
munity banks use a correspondent bank to provide cross-border transactions. As a result, most
community banks do not deal directly with institutions located outside the United States.”);
see White, supra note 52, at 9–11, 20 (explaining that while most payment systems follow a
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more expensive than using a domestic-payment system, for at each point in
the transaction, the parties must not only absorb the cost of the foreign-
exchange spread, but must also pay the bank—functionally a broker—a
fee.54
The lack of a central settlement institution leads to a highly complex
international payment system, which creates risks because processing trans-
actions involves a series of separate settlement processes. The Federal Re-
serve’s role as central settlor in the U.S. payment system mitigates almost all
credit and liquidity risk, but these risks become very real in the interna-
tional-payments system.55 Because there is no single global-payments rail
that connects the payer to the payee to effect final settlement, a payment
must travel on one domestic-payment rail in one country, then cross na-
tional borders through correspondent banks, before jumping to a domestic-
payment rail in another country.56 This inefficient system results in in-
creased transaction costs and creates risk that the payment will get stuck (for
example, if a bank in the chain fails or cannot process a transaction) as it
travels between different rails.57 Ripple, however, provides a single rail,
which could reduce the inefficiencies and risks associated with the current
international-payments system.
II. Ripple: Powering the Movement of Money Through
Distributed Settlement
Ripple moves money through an alternative settlement mechanism
called “distributed settlement.”58 Distributed settlement functions without a
central settlement institution; rather than relying on a central bank to up-
date its ledger to settle transactions and facilitate fund transfers, Ripple
processes transactions through a public ledger that Ripple users update
through algorithmic settling.59
This Part explains what Ripple is, how it works, and how it is governed
and managed. This Part argues that Ripple’s distributed settlement process
provides a novel way of accounting for the movement of money that is more
efficient than current models. It then argues that regulators’ current ap-
proach to Ripple fails to account for Ripple’s unusual governance and man-
agement structure, resulting in inefficient and flawed supervision of this
modern payment system.
form of this “typical” interbank payment system model, the degree of tiers varies in different
countries and markets).
54. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 35.
55. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 10–12, 16–22.
56. See id. at 9–11, 20.
57. See id. at 12–13.
58. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11.
59. See id.
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A. Ripple Balances and Distributed Settlement
Ripple facilitates the movement of money through distributed settle-
ment, a way of transmitting money that is fundamentally different from
existing systems. In distributed settlement, a ledger is distributed among,
and algorithmically updated by, the collective actions of Ripple users rather
than a central party.60 This is a public—as opposed to a private or central
bank—ledger because every Ripple user can see and update the ledger.61 The
public ledger records every single transaction processed through the Ripple
protocol and keeps track of all Ripple users’ balances.62 It is a publicly main-
tained record-keeping mechanism. While the correspondent-banking system
requires each financial institution in the payment chain to update its indi-
vidual ledger, the collective users of Ripple update a single, public ledger
that represents every user’s balance, which enables the system to process a
collection of fund transfers immediately.63 Ripple’s public ledger facilitates a
move from a model that depends on centralized actors to update their indi-
vidual ledgers to a system in which decentralized actors update a single,
public ledger. In essence, it flips the correspondent-banking model on its
head.64
Distributed settlement is a significant innovation because it solves two
problems that parties do not encounter when they settle a transaction
through a central settlement institution: the double-spending problem and
Denial of Service attacks. The double-spending problem refers to the risk
that a user could instruct the system to make a payment to multiple
counterparties at the same time even if that user only had enough money to
make a payment to one counterparty.65 To prevent this double-spending
problem, distributed-settlement systems must ensure the accurate ordering
of transactions.66 Ripple does this through a process called “consensus.”67
60. Id. In contrast, only the Federal Reserve or Goldman Sachs can update their respec-
tive ledgers. See id. at 4–5.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Ripple’s rejection of a central settlement institution also means it uses a different
type of settlement asset. Id. at 4. Gateways, which are where “fiat money enters and exits the
Ripple protocol,” turn cash deposited by their customers into balances that they can transfer
across the Ripple network. Bryant Gehring, How Ripple Works, Ripple (Oct. 16, 2014), https://
ripple.com/knowledge_center/how-ripple-works/ [http://perma.cc/UM6B-4EPU]. These “Rip-
ple balances,” which reflect the balance type (dollars or Euros) and the party that issues them
(that is, Yellow Bank), are settlement assets that users trade across the Ripple network. The
Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11, 32. “This is important because USD balances issued by
two different banks are technically liabilities of different institutions and have different
counterparty risk profiles. From the perspective of the protocol, they are different financial
instruments.” Id. at 15.
65. Pedro Franco, Understanding Bitcoin: Cryptography, Engineering, and Ec-
onomics 12 (2015).
66. See id.
67. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11.
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Consensus involves validating nodes, Ripple users who vote to verify the
authenticity of a transaction, agreeing to reject or approve a transaction as
valid.68 If a supermajority of validating nodes approve a transaction, the vali-
dating nodes update the public ledger.69 This process enables secure and
real-time settlement without using a central institution.70
The second problem that Ripple solved is the problem of Denial of Ser-
vice attacks.71 A Denial of Service attack refers to a malicious act in which
someone “creates many identities in a peer-to-peer network to exert a dis-
proportionately large influence.”72 For instance, an attacker could create a
large number of accounts (or public keys) and flood the network with fake
or otherwise illegitimate transactions.73 Enough requests would compromise
the consensus process and significantly disrupt settlement, or they could so
overwhelm a server that the server could not respond to legitimate requests,
which would paralyze the network.74
Ripple’s innovative solution to Denial of Service attacks is a virtual cur-
rency called the XRP.75 Like other digital currencies such as Bitcoin, XRP is a
“math-based currency” or a “cryptocurrency.”76 XRP is the native currency
of the Ripple ledger, just like Bitcoin is the native currency of the
68. David Schwartz et al., Ripple Labs Inc., The Ripple Protocol Consensus Al-
gorithm 2–3 (2014), http://www.naation.com/ripple-consensus-whitepaper.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/4JPA-78YK]. Ripple signs every transaction that parties submit to the network with a
digital signature, which relies on public/private key cryptography. The Ripple Protocol,
supra note 1, at 11. Each user then selects a list, called a “unique node list,” comprising other
users that it trusts as validating nodes. Schwartz et al., supra, at 3; Unique Node List, Ripple
Wiki, https://wiki.ripple.com/Unique_Node_List [http://perma.cc/L6PU-CETV] (last modi-
fied Oct. 10, 2014, 7:00 PM). Each validating node independently verifies every proposed
transaction within its network to determine if it is valid. A transaction is valid if the correct
signature appears on the transaction, which is the signature of the funds’ owner, and whether
the parties have enough funds to make the transaction. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1,
at 11; see Schwartz et al., supra, at 1–3. If it believes that the transaction is valid, it “votes”
for it to be included in the updated ledger. If a supermajority of nodes do not vote for the
transaction, the system rejects the transaction and it is not reflected in the next updated ledger.
See Schwartz et al., supra, at 1–4.
69. Ripple requires a supermajority (80 percent) of nodes to vote for the transaction
before it is reflected in the next ledger update. See Schwartz et al., supra note 68, at 4. After
several rounds of voting, the current public ledger will close and become the “last-closed
ledger.” Id. Because all the nodes will maintain the same last-closed ledger, the last-closed
ledger reflects the correct Ripple balances of all the users in the network at a particular mo-
ment in time. Id. at 2.
70. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11.
71. See id. at 14. People also often refer to Denial of Service attacks as Sybil attacks. See
id.
72. Franco, supra note 65, at 165 n.3.
73. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 14.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 14–15.
76. Id. at 14. A cryptocurrency is a type of digital asset that entities transfer within a
network and whose creation and distribution is verifiable using mathematical properties. Id. at
12.
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blockchain,77 the publicly distributed ledger used and maintained by Bitcoin
users.78 But unlike the Bitcoin protocol, Ripple is currency agnostic: users
can choose not to use XRP as a medium of exchange and can instead use
other currencies.79 This allows Ripple to settle, for example, foreign-ex-
change transactions.
The Ripple protocol requires each account to hold a small reserve of
XRP in order to create ledger entries.80 The twenty XRP (or about $0.16)81
reserve requirement is a negligible transaction fee for normal users, but it
would be a significant cost for attackers who wish to flood the network with
many false transactions.82 As a second line of defense, with each transaction
that Ripple processes, it destroys 0.00001 XRP (roughly $0.00000008).83
While this fee is worth virtually nothing, when the system must process
many transactions—such as when someone attempts to overload the server
through a Denial of Service attack—the fee rises rapidly.84 This makes De-
nial of Service attacks extremely expensive for attackers.
B. Changing the International-Payments System:
Atomic and Straight Through Settlement
In addition to offering an alternative settlement mechanism, Ripple’s
other significant innovation is offering atomic (all or nothing), real-time
settlement for cross-border payments. Ripple does this by relying on third-
party intermediaries called “market makers.”85 By providing liquidity, mar-
ket makers provide an end-to-end payment rail between a payer and a
payee.86 In the case of cross-border payments, a market maker would be a
foreign-exchange trader who posts bids and offers to trade currencies on
Ripple’s exchange.87 Market makers in the Ripple network provide a func-
tion typical of market makers in other markets: they match buyers and sell-
ers and profit off spreads at the price they buy and sell a particular asset.88
The Ripple protocol then routes every transaction to the cheapest available
77. Id. at 14.
78. Franco, supra note 65, at 15–16.
79. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 14–16.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Ripple/US Dollar (XRP/USD) Price Chart, CoinGecko, https://www.coingecko.com/
en/price_charts/ripple/usd [http://perma.cc/K8LX-D85T].
82. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 14.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Bryant Gehring, What Are Market Makers?, Ripple (Oct. 16, 2014), https://ripple
.com/knowledge_center/market-makers-2/ [http://perma.cc/XC57-9A6K?]
86. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 12–13.
87. See id. at 12.
88. See id. at 12–13. For example, consider the example in which a Ripple user in Europe
wishes to pay a Ripple user in the United States. The gateways of the payer and the payee do
not hold balances with each other. The market maker establishes “trust lines” with both gate-
ways by setting up accounts with each of them. Id. The market maker facilitates the transaction
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price.89 But the Ripple protocol looks not only for the cheapest offer, but the
cheapest path, causing market makers to not only provide liquidity, but to
actively compete for spreads.90
In addition, because Ripple’s transactions are atomic, Ripple eliminates
the risk that payments will not reach the targeted payee once the payer initi-
ates the transaction.91 For example, if a party wants to complete a transac-
tion, it may have to pass through multiple market makers to reach the payee.
But even if a transaction must pass through multiple market makers who
operate in different currencies, either the entire transaction happens or none
of the steps happen at all.92 Thus, the atomic nature of a Ripple transaction
means that it cannot get stuck at a single market maker, eliminating
counterparty risk.93 If a market maker cannot facilitate the transaction, for
example, because of a lack of liquidity, either the Ripple protocol will bypass
that market maker and find another, or the transaction will not occur at
all.94
Because these transactions happen in real time, the Ripple protocol in-
creases cost savings95 and allows parties to better manage their risks.96 While
international correspondent-banking model transactions can take up to four
days to process,97 creating uncertainty for the payer and payee, under Ripple,
parties know their positions immediately.98 Real-time settlement also
reduces the transaction costs of each discrete settlement process associated
with traditional cross-border payments.99
by simultaneously buying Euros from the European gateway and selling dollars to the U.S.
gateway. Id.
89. Id. Even for a more complicated transaction involving multiple currencies, there is
one path that runs from a payer to a payee. This is because the distributed settlement process
allows a one-step, end-to-end settlement between the payer and the payee. Id. For example,
imagine that a European wants to pay somebody in South Korean Won. There might not be a
liquid market for Euro/Won exchanges. However, the Ripple protocol finds a path—the cheap-
est path—to facilitate that transaction, which may involve swapping Won for Dollars, and then
swapping Dollars for Euros. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 12–13.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Gehring, supra note 85. For example, in the absence of real-time settle-
ment, a transaction may get stuck if a bank in the payment chain fails while it holds the
payment that is in transit. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 13.
94. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 13.
95. Id. at 2. Ripple typically processes transactions in three to six seconds. Id.
96. See id. at 11 (explaining the process of consensus used by Ripple to create fast and
secure settlement on the Ripple Network).
97. Houman Shadab, How Bitcoin Will Change International Bank Payments, Coin
Center (Mar. 9, 2015), https://coincenter.org/2015/03/bitcoin-will-change-international-
bank-payments/ [http://perma.cc/LCM2-EBLV].
98. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 13 & n.3.
99. Id. at 11. Through real-time settlement, parties access their funds more quickly, al-
lowing them to allocate their resources to more productive uses instead of having their money
tied up in a delayed foreign-exchange transaction. See id. at 2, 22.
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Ripple not only creates a faster settlement system, but it also allows par-
ties to make foreign-exchange trades with fewer transaction costs. Although
“[t]he average bank . . . charge[s] [a] 5.88%” foreign-exchange transaction
fee100 in addition to the FX spread, Ripple users pay only the FX spread (and
a negligible amount of XRP).101 Although manual control over trading
makes FX transactions expensive,102 Ripple’s best path algorithm ensures
users get the lowest spread available on the network and takes the control of
trades out of brokers’ hands.103 The Ripple protocol thus enables cheaper FX
trades, allowing users to direct their capital to more productive uses. Ripple
may be particularly significant for reducing costs in the massive and expen-
sive global remittance market.104
Ripple provides a way to settle international payments speedily and reli-
ably in the absence of a global central bank. Ripple provides the essential
central settlement function that the current international-financial system
lacks. Perhaps it comes as little surprise, then, that financial institutions have
begun to adopt distributed ledger technology systems, such as Ripple, to tap
into the estimated $15–20 billion a year in savings by improving their settle-
ment systems.105 Ripple has partnerships with financial institutions across
the world, including Germany-based bank Fidor, Kansas-based CBW Bank,
New Jersey-based Cross River Bank,106 and three of Australia’s “big four
100. Alina Comoreanu, Currency Exchange Study: How to Save on International Spending,
CardHub (May 12, 2015), http://www.cardhub.com/edu/currency-exchange-study/ [http://
perma.cc/AT7M-EQK4].
101. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 5, 9.
102. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys., Bank for Int’l Settlements & World
Bank, General Principles for International Remittance Services 15 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter CPSS on Int’l Remittances], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d76.pdf [http://perma.cc/
47LB-9T76]. Manual control has also enabled bankers to manipulate FX spreads at their cli-
ents’ expense in a series of recent high-profile scandals that have led to over $5.7 billion in
fines. Jerin Mathew, FX Fixing Scandal: Citigroup Paid $2.5BN in Fines for Rigging Currency
Rates as Bank Made Just $1M from Misconduct, Int’l Bus. Times (June 11, 2015, 2:47 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/fx-fixing-scandal-citigroup-paid-2-5bn-fines-rigging-currency-
rates-bank-made-just-1m-1505515 [http://perma.cc/EQ3Q-RADE].
103. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 9.
104. The World Bank estimates that almost 250 million migrant workers sent approxi-
mately $440 billion to their homes in developing countries in 2014. Dilip Ratha et al.,
Migration and Remittances, Migration & Development Brief 24, at 1 (2015), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/Migration-
andDevelopmentBrief24.pdf [http://perma.cc/DR2K-SUJM]. But because the foreign-exchange
market depends on manual processing, the low value of remittance transactions makes them
relatively more expensive than commercial foreign-exchange transactions: on average, global
migrants pay 8 percent to send money abroad, with the highest average cost reaching 12 per-
cent in sub-Saharan Africa. CPSS on Int’l Remittances, supra note 102, at 15; Dilip Ratha
et al., supra, at 1.
105. See Santander InnoVentures et al., supra note 6, at 15 (suggesting that “distrib-
uted ledger technology could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs attributable to cross-border
payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by between $15-20 billion per annum
by 2022”).
106. James Schneider & S.K. Prasad Borra, Goldman Sachs, The Future of Fi-
nance, Part 2: Redefining “The Way We Pay” in the Next Decade 56 (2015), http://www
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banks”—the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Westpac Banking Corp, and
the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group.107 Perhaps surprisingly,
Western Union (which charges $40 to send $500 overseas), is also consider-
ing a partnership with Ripple.108
C. Decentralized Governance
Ripple presents innovations at the operational level that will reduce
many risks presented by current payment systems, but its unusually decen-
tralized governance structure may pose new challenges and risks to entities
interested in regulating Ripple. Current regulatory regimes for payment sys-
tems, and institutions within payment systems, have depended on some sort
of central operator. Although Ripple Labs is developing and promoting the
Ripple protocol, it does not actually control or maintain the protocol.109 De-
velopment of the protocol depends on the system’s users adopting proposed
changes to the protocol.110 In contrast, centralized legal entities own or oper-
ate the existing major payment systems.111
Ripple’s development is unusual because changes to the Ripple protocol
occur only through the validating nodes.112 Just as validating nodes must
update Ripple’s ledger and vote to approve a transaction, a majority of
nodes must approve a proposed change to the protocol.113 Any entity can
.slideshare.net/jqvcru/gs-the-future-of-finance-redefining-the-way-we-pay-in-the-next-dec-
ade-150310 [http://perma.cc/XDW4-5UD7].
107. Paul Smith, Westpac, ANZ Trial Ripple Payments, but Big Four Reluctant on Bitcoin,
Australian Fin. Rev. (June 9, 2015, 4:12 AM), http://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-
finance/financial-services/westpac-anz-trial-ripple-payments-but-big-four-reluctant-on-bitcoi
n-20150608-ghhmsq [http://perma.cc/4KFY-2FR8].
108. Philip Ryan, Western Union Will Give Ripple a Chance, Bank Innovation (Apr. 29,
2015), http://bankinnovation.net/2015/04/western-union-will-give-ripple-a-chance/ [http://
perma.cc/UQC8-K33X].
109. If Ripple Labs were to disappear, “[t]he Ripple network would then operate indepen-
dently of Ripple Labs.” FAQ, Ripple Wiki, https://wiki.ripple.com/FAQ [http://perma.cc/
9HYS-MYF6] (last modified May 27, 2015, 1:13 AM).
110. See Understanding: Forking the Ripple Protocol, Ripple Wiki, https://wiki.ripple.com/
understanding:_Forking_the_Ripple_Protocol [http://perma.cc/3565-TWCB?type=source]
(last modified Apr. 17, 2014, 6:08 AM).
111. For example, the Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. operates EPN and oper-
ates Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). CPSS on Int’l Payment Systems,
supra note 29, at 488, 493.
112. Email from Ryan Zagone, Dir. of Regulatory Relations, Ripple Labs, Inc., to authors
(Aug. 6, 2015, 12:09 AM) (on file with authors); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 68, at 4.
113. Email from Ryan Zagone to authors, supra note 112. As Zagone explains,
“[i]n order for a change to the protocol to be made, a majority (at least) of validators
must support the proposed change. . . . Once a threshold of validators review and accept
a change to the protocol, a two-week countdown begins before the change goes live. The
two weeks allows time for others to analyze the change and make a case for or against it.
The change has to hold a majority for two weeks to get implemented.”
Id. In addition, the protocol could “fork.” Understanding: Forking the Ripple Protocol, supra
note 110. Forking refers to a situation in which a segment of the protocol’s users split off into
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propose a change to the Ripple protocol.114 Because Ripple is an open-source
protocol controlled by no single entity, the only way that Ripple Labs, as a
developer, can introduce new features into the protocol is by proposing a
change.115 But a change to the protocol would only occur if at least a major-
ity of validators accept a proposal.116
Also, Ripple does not replace existing relationships, but instead “plugs
in” to existing structures.117 In other words, while Ripple improves the un-
derlying settlement infrastructure of global-payment systems, it does not af-
fect the existing legal relationships between the participants of such
systems.118 For example, financial institutions that use Ripple must continue
to rely on the bilateral agreements they had in place before joining Ripple.119
Ripple provides only the rail on which payments move, it does not define
any other aspect of financial institutions’ relationships or legal responsibili-
ties.120 Rather than displace current institutions, Ripple plugs into an already
vibrant and regulated payment ecosystem: to succeed, it depends on “part-
nerships with banks, payment processors, money transmitters, and other fi-
nancial services institutions.”121
D. Current Regulatory Status of Ripple
Because Ripple plugs in to existing structures and serves only as pay-
ment rails, regulators logically treat Ripple as an entity that financial institu-
tions install, like software. Ripple’s discussions with regulators have centered
on Ripple’s status as a “third-party vendor” to financial institutions.122 A
collection of federal agencies—the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Financial Institutions
their own group and use a modified version of the software. Linus Nyman & Juho Lindman,
Code Forking, Governance, and Sustainability in Open Source Software, Tech. Innovation
Mgmt. Rev., Jan. 2013, at 7, 7–8. This means that two different versions of the protocol would
operate independently of one another. Id. at 7. “The right to fork code is built into the very
definition of what it means to be an open source program.” Id. at 8.
114. Email from Ryan Zagone, Dir. of Regulatory Relations, Ripple Labs, Inc., to authors
(Aug. 9, 2015, 3:39 PM) (on file with authors).
115. See id.; Understanding: Forking the Ripple Protocol, supra note 110.
116. Email from Ryan Zagone to authors, supra note 112. See generally Nyman &
Lindman, supra note 113 (explaining the role of code forking in the governance and sus-
tainability of open source software).
117. Telephone Interview with Ryan Zagone, supra note 10.
118. See id.
119. See id. So, for example, if no bilateral agreements are in place, the financial institu-
tions that use Ripple must make those agreements before transactions on Ripple rails can
occur. See id.
120. See id.
121. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at i; see Alec Liu, Ripple Labs Joins NACHA
Alliance, Ripple (June 9, 2014), https://ripple.com/blog/ripple-labs-joins-nacha-alliance/
[http://perma.cc/WBK8-YZE2].
122. See Telephone Interview with Ryan Zagone, supra note 10.
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Examination Council—regulates financial institutions’ relationships with
third-party vendors.123 These regulations would put the burden on financial
institutions to engage in “effective risk management” practices in their rela-
tionships with Ripple.124
This approach is weak because many of these rules simply do not make
sense when applied to Ripple. For example, the OCC suggests an effective
risk-management process would include “written contracts that outline the
rights and responsibilities of all parties.”125 And at least one commentator
suggests the “key” to effective risk management of third-party vendors “is
the contract.”126 But because Ripple is a protocol, and Ripple Labs has no
effective control over the development of that protocol, any contract with
Ripple Labs would be meaningless; a contract with the Ripple protocol
would be impossible. Similarly, because no single entity controls Ripple,
there would be no way to manage the risks Ripple poses: its development
depends on its users. The structural reality of Ripple demands that the “key”
to managing Ripple would involve monitoring and putting processes in
place that could mitigate the consequences of negative developments in Rip-
ple’s protocol.
Not only do the rules make little sense as they apply to Ripple, they also
do not meet international standards of quality financial regulation. By su-
pervising financial institutions’ relationships with Ripple, instead of focusing
on Ripple itself, regulators fail to create a regulatory structure that would
enable transparency and communication between regulators and Ripple
(leaving Ripple without the ability to effectively represent itself);127 develop
123. New OCC Standards Require Stricter Oversight of Third-Party Relationships, Baker
Tilly (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.bakertilly.com/insights/new-occ-standards-require-stricter-
oversight-of-third-party-relationships/ [http://perma.cc/MRN6-326G].
124. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
OCC Bull. 2013-29, Risk Management Guidance (2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issu-
ances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html [http://perma.cc/7C76-YK3G]. The OCC, which is
the primary prudential regulator for national banks, for example, would require banks to: (1)
create plans that identify the inherent risks of using Ripple, including details about how the
bank selects, assesses, and oversees it; (2) conduct “proper due diligence” before adopting
Ripple; (3) monitor Ripple once implemented; (4) establish contingency plans for terminating
the relationship in an effective manner; (5) establish clear roles and responsibilities for over-
seeing and managing Ripple; (6) establish documentation and reporting that facilitates over-
sight, accountability, monitoring, and risk management of Ripple; and (7) conduct
independent reviews that allow bank management to determine whether the bank’s process
aligns with Ripple’s strategy. Id.
125. Id.
126. New OCC Standards Require Stricter Oversight of Third-Party Relationships, supra
note 123.
127. See generally Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New
Foundation 3, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ZR3X-597X] (noting that financial regulation oversight should “promote trans-
parency, simplicity, fairness, accountability, and access”); Julia Black & Ste´phane Jacobzone,
Tools for Regulatory Quality and Financial Sector Regulation: A Cross-Country Perspective
(OECD Working Papers on Public Governance No. 16, 2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
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the protocol in socially beneficial ways;128 assess the burden of rules on
banks or other institutions that use Ripple;129 comprehensively regulate pay-
ment systems;130 provide the government the ability to manage a potential
crisis involving Ripple;131 and create international coordination mecha-
nisms.132 While the current approach cannot meet these goals, the next Part
suggests comprehensive principles that not only meet these basic standards
of quality financial regulation, but do so in a realistic way. That is, the pro-
posed principles account for Ripple’s unusual governance and management
structure and reflect the particular risks Ripple mitigates and poses to the
global financial system.
III. A Principles-Based Approach to Regulating Ripple
The main challenge in formulating a regulatory approach for Ripple is
that it is a decentralized Internet payment protocol (DIPP), making it differ-
ent from other payment systems. Regulators must account for Ripple’s nu-
ances to preserve its efficiency, but they must also ensure its users do not
impose negative externalities on other market participants and the real econ-
omy. Principles that regulate financial market utilities based on the assump-
tion that they use a central settlement institution owned by somebody will
not lead to this optimal degree of regulation. These decentralized and
unowned protocols present different risks but also mitigate others. And be-
cause Ripple has an international focus, regulators must coordinate and
communicate with stakeholders in other jurisdictions. At the same time,
Ripple has an interest in avoiding duplicitous and possibly conflicting regu-
lations from different jurisdictions. Thus this Part proposes six principles
based on existing internationally produced principles but amended to ac-
count for the particular risks posed and mitigated by Ripple. Ultimately, this
Part hopes to construct a new set of guiding principles for Internet protocols
based on the Ripple model.
The principles upon which this Part rely come from the Committee on
Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI), a committee of twenty-five
central banks that sets global standards for the international regulation of
payment systems.133 In 2012, the CPMI, along with the Technical Committee
218772641848 [http://perma.cc/8BMG-3KWT] (analyzing principles of “quality regulation”
systems of financial regulators in five countries).
128. See generally Economic Crisis Summit, Report of the Commission of Experts of the
President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and
Financial System (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_
CoE.pdf [http://perma.cc/R7WR-FZD8].
129. Black & Jacobzone, supra note 127, at 49–50.
130. See Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 127, at 3.
131. See id. at 8.
132. See id. at 8–9; Black & Jacobzone, supra note 127, at 9–10.
133. It also sets standards for settling and clearing systems. Comm. on Payments & Mkt.
Infrastructures, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Charter 1 (2014), http://www.bis.org/
cpmi/charter.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6SR-DMSS]. It is a member of the Financial Stability
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of the International Committee of Securities Commissioners, released a set
of standards known as the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures
(PFMIs).134 The main public policy objectives of the PFMIs are to enhance
safety and efficiency in payment, clearing, settlement, and recording ar-
rangements, and, more broadly, to limit systemic risk and foster trans-
parency and financial stability.135
With respect to Ripple, the United States and international regulators
are failing the PFMIs. Principle I, as explained below, states that a financial
market utility “should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforcea-
ble legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdic-
tions.”136 But this does not yet exist for Ripple. And because it likely qualifies
as a financial market utility137 and the United States and Europe have largely
adopted the PFMIs,138 they are neglecting their legal duty to ensure a legiti-
mate legal regime supports Ripple. Part of this Note’s goal is to help U.S.
regulators and international bodies begin the process of providing a “well-
founded” legal basis for Ripple. This Note’s second goal is to provide sub-
stantive suggestions for how to improve these PFMIs to account for the dif-
ferent risks Ripple and other DIPPs pose.
A. Principle I: Comprehensive Legal Frameworks for the
Institutions That Use Ripple
The legal basis for a payment system is critical to its overall soundness,
and it consists of framework legislation as well as specific laws, regulations,
and agreements governing payments on the transactional level as well as the
Board and also coordinates with other international standard setters, such as the International
Organization of Securities Commissions and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Id.
These international standard-setting bodies sit at the heart of the modern global financial
architecture. Michael S. Barr, Who’s in Charge of Global Finance?, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 971
(2014).
134. Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys. & Tech. Comm. Int’l Org. Secs.
Comm’ns, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Principles for Financial Market Infrastruc-
tures (2012) [hereinafter The PFMIs], http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/F8N9-DMVA].
135. Id. at 5–7. The PFMIs define a financial market infrastructure as a multilateral sys-
tem among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the pur-
poses of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial
transactions. Id. at 7. The CPMI notes that financial market utilities can differ in organization,
function, and design, and can be legally organized in a variety of forms. Id. Because Ripple
settles payment transactions, it likely qualifies as a financial market utility.
136. Id. at 21.
137. See supra note 135.
138. Not only has the Federal Reserve issued regulations for payment systems consistent
with these principles, Payment System Risk, Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys., http://www
.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr_about.htm [http://perma.cc/9LJ5-M66E] (last up-
dated July 23, 2015), but the Governing Council of the European Central Bank incorporated
the PFMIs in June 2013. European Cent. Bank, Eurosystem Oversight Report 2014, at 6
(2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eurosystemoversightreport2014.en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CR8R-S7KP].
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systemic level.139 The PFMIs look to the rights and obligations of parties to
payments transactions in addition to the system itself.140 If risk management
is to be sound and efficient, the rights and obligations relating to payment
system operations require a high degree of certainty.141
Because no single entity can change the Ripple protocol, there is no
centralized institution that regulators can force to make positive changes to
the protocol. Ripple Labs or any other institution can propose changes, but
the protocol changes only if a majority of users accept a given proposal.142 In
contrast, a central institution—the Federal Reserve and the National Auto-
mated Clearing House Association (NACHA), a self-regulatory organization
representing ACH users—has actual control over the development of the
clearing and settlement system of ACH.143 Although the Federal Reserve can
monitor the ACH system’s developments, the Federal Reserve could not jus-
tifiably require Ripple Labs to change the protocol, or punish it for failing to
do so.
Regulators could continue to supervise users’ relationships with Ripple
on the individual level like the OCC does now. But that does not solve the
problems presented by the current third-party vendor approach analyzed
above.144 Still, regulators must recognize that the Ripple protocol and other
DIPPs do not define any legal rights or obligations of its members.145 Ripple
instead plugs into the existing legal framework of the institutions that use
Ripple: it sits at the bottom of a payment ecosystem that already experiences
(at least in the United States) comprehensive regulation.146 For example,
UCC regulations at the transactional level would apply to any transaction
that users performed using Ripple.147 And correspondent relationships
would continue to have to define the legal connections between banks even
if Ripple gave those banks the technology—the Ripple protocol—to settle
monetary obligations with one another.148
Since regulators did not design these frameworks for institutions that
used a settlement infrastructure powered by a DIPP, these frameworks can-
not efficiently account for the settlement risks that Ripple poses and miti-
gates. It is more likely that the Ripple protocol would actually reduce many
139. The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 21–25.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.
143. See Stephanie Heller, An Endangered Species: The Increasing Irrelevance of Article 4 of
the UCC in an Electronics-Based Payments System, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 513, 516 n.18, 517 n.20
(2006).
144. See supra Section II.D.
145. See supra Section II.C.
146. See supra notes 117–124 and accompanying text.
147. See U.C.C. § 4A (Am. Law Inst. & Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State
Laws 2012) (governing wholesale fund transfers).
148. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text (explaining that Ripple does not
affect the existing legal relationships—including correspondent relations—between partici-
pants in global-payment systems).
February 2016] The Ripple Case Study 669
risks that current regulations seek to mitigate. For example, because Ripple
dramatically reduces settlement and counterparty risk through its real-time
settlement of atomic transactions, detailed requirements for who could use
Ripple would reduce very little risk while increasing inefficiencies by reduc-
ing access to financial market utilities.149 By recognizing Ripple’s ability to
mitigate counterparty and settlement risk, more market participants will
have access to real-time settlement institutions.150
In addition to challenging the logical basis for existing regulations, Rip-
ple may test the legal relevancy of other domestic rules. For example, in-
creased access to Ripple would increase pressure on its operations, making
its operational soundness, settlement systems, and the finality of its transac-
tions more important. To clearly establish finality, it is important for the
legal framework to define when a payment has occurred. For example, in the
United States, UCC 4A defines when a payment has legally occurred.151 De-
termining when a payment has legally occurred is crucial to establishing the
final positions of members in multilateral netting systems.152 That is, deter-
mining the order of payments is important for a central institution, like the
Federal Reserve, with ACH, which has to net a batch of transactions at
once.153 But because Ripple is a real-time gross settlement system, positions
between two parties are final when the transaction occurs. Simply, the legal
definition becomes obsolete in the face of this new technology. These regula-
tory reference points thus seem irrelevant, potentially imposing additional
undue burdens and inefficiencies on Ripple users.
Furthermore, Ripple’s international appeal means that reviewing the
relevant legal framework will not only depend on domestic laws, but also on
international laws. This will require regulators to assess the complex issues
149. Limiting access to a financial market utility to only large and safe institutions is a way
to reduce counterparty and settlement risks. Cf. supra note 30 (explaining the Clearing House
Interbank Payments System access limitations to only fifty financial institutions). In addition,
Ripple reduces another risk that even central settlement institutions cannot mitigate: principal
risk. Because the Federal Reserve does not provide real-time settlement for the vast majority of
payments, its role as central operator introduces another risk into the United States’ payments
system: “principal risk.” See supra notes 27, 32 and accompanying text; see also Glossary,
supra note 12, at 40. Principal risk is the risk that a party will lose the value involved in the
transaction because of a lag between the final settlement of the various legs of a transaction.
Glossary, supra note 12, at 40. This risk becomes particularly acute in the case of foreign
payments. See Gabriele Galati, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS Bank, BIS
Q. Rev., Dec. 2002, at 55, 55–58.
150. Recall that ACH, which has delayed settlement, facilitated 21.7 billion transactions in
2012 compared to FedWire’s 287.5 million transactions, and that only approximately fifty
American banks have access to CHIPS. See supra notes 29, 32 and accompanying text.
151. U.C.C. § 4A.
152. See Comm. on Payment & Settlement Sys., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Core
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems 20 (2001) [hereinafter CPSIPS],
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf [http://perma.cc/F9V2-RTEF] (explaining how obliga-
tions of senders in a multilateral netting system are satisfied under UCC 4A).
153. See Purposes & Functions, supra note 27, at 93–94.
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arising from possible conflicts between relevant laws of different jurisdic-
tions.154 In assessing whether a comprehensive legal framework exists for
Ripple and its users, regulators must have flexible solutions to these potential
problems. As Ripple expands into other jurisdictions, including those with
less-developed legal institutions, this issue may become increasingly
significant.155
B. Principle II: Stakeholder Buy-In: International Forums of Regulators
and a Ripple-SRO
Ripple’s decentralized development structure and international presence
means that its effective governance will depend on regulators changing their
regulatory paradigm. Rather than impose regulations on the protocol, regu-
lators need to work with Ripple users and international bodies to effectively
regulate the protocol. As Principle X of the PFMIs explains, financial market
utilities must have “effective, accountable and transparent governance” that
promotes the safety and efficiency of Ripple and support the stability of the
broader financial system.156 That same Principle, however, dictates that ef-
fective governance would also consider the interests of relevant stakehold-
ers.157 Because Ripple’s stakeholders are widespread and diverse, the biggest
challenge to regulating Ripple is defining the entities that should be account-
able as leaders for pursuing the objectives and policy considerations of its
stakeholders.
To effectively respond to this need, an international forum of regulators,
chaired by the Federal Reserve and a self-regulatory organization represent-
ing Ripple users, should govern Ripple. Because users manage the system’s
developments, an effective discourse between these users and regulators is
the most effective way to ensure efficiency and accountability. A trade group
that represents Ripple’s users could ensure the stakeholders who control
Ripple have a voice in its regulation.
NACHA, a self-regulatory organization that governs ACH with the Fed-
eral Reserve, provides an excellent model for ensuring broad stakeholder
154. Cf. CPSIPS, supra note 152, at 5. (“Although the Core Principles are expressed in
terms of payment systems in a single country, they are equally applicable where the payment
system arrangements extend over a broader economic area, such as where a single payment
system or a collection of interconnected payment systems cover a region broader than a
country.”).
155. For example, which insolvency laws to follow in case a gateway becomes insolvent
may prove a significant question. Clear guidelines would be necessary to solve this problem.
Regulators could do this between themselves through memorandums of understanding. Or
they could turn to Ripple’s users and have the gateways delineate in their correspondent agree-
ments which insolvency laws to follow. In any event, when uncertainty exists regarding the
enforceability of Ripple’s choice of law in relevant jurisdictions, the relevant regulatory body
should obtain reasoned and independent legal opinions and analysis to properly address such
uncertainty.
156. CPSIPS, supra note 152, at 53.
157. Id. at 54.
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involvement.158 NACHA’s Operating Rules form the legal foundation for
every ACH payment by defining the “roles and responsibilities of financial
institutions and establishing clear guidelines for each Network partici-
pant.”159 NACHA’s rules apply to the financial institutions that initiate pay-
ments on ACH.160 While NACHA’s rules do not directly reach merchants
and other nonfinancial institutions that use the ACH, NACHA’s rules gov-
ern financial institutions’ relationships with these entities, requiring them to
meet certain requirements.161 And when institutions use the Federal Reserve
to transmit payments, the Federal Reserve incorporates the NACHA rules by
reference.162 So a self-regulatory organization regulates a payment system op-
erated by private and public bodies.
This sort of self-regulatory model could work for a DIPP like Ripple.
Although Ripple’s development depends on dispersed and decentralized
users, many of its proposed users will be the same financial institutions that
NACHA represents. In fact, Ripple could be integrated with (or modeled
after) a self-regulatory organization like NACHA; the NACHA rules would
continue to define the financial institutions that use ACH and Ripple.163 In
these cases, the existing legal rights and obligations set forth by the payment
system will not change.
In addition, not only does the very foundation of the Ripple protocol
mirror a self-regulatory organization in many ways, but it provides the best
means to ensure users develop the protocol in the most socially beneficial
way.164 Ripple users must accept (by at least a majority) any changes to the
protocol.165 The development of the protocol, in its very essence, is self-regu-
latory (although it is a de facto and not a de jure sort of self-representation).
This sort of organization could help motivate user buy-in because it would
158. NACHA, which is a nonprofit trade association organization that represents 11,000
financial institutions, is responsible for developing comprehensive rules and business practices
for members of the ACH network. See Heller, supra note 143, at 516 n.18.
159. NACHA Operating Rules, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/rules [http://perma.cc/
59F9-JZW4].
160. See Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, The Role of Private Sector Payment Rules and
a Proposed Approach for Evaluating Future Changes to Payments Law, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
937, 941–42 (2008).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 941.
163. Ripple Labs is a member of NACHA. Liu, supra note 121.
164. Something like a trade group for Ripple has already emerged: the “International Rip-
ple Business Association is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit whose focus is on providing support to
businesses being built on the Ripple Protocol.” About, Int’l Ripple Bus. Ass’n, http://www
.ripplebusiness.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/3V6K-N9JJ]. Although this association is not so
much a governance arrangement as it is a support group with voluntary membership, its
existence suggests that Ripple users can coordinate to develop something akin to NACHA. See
id. The International Ripple Business Association “offers disclosure standards, best practices,
educational tools, publications, events and networking opportunities to its members,” which
includes gateways and individual users. Id.
165. See Understanding: Forking the Ripple Protocol, supra note 110.
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give users a forum to communicate their views with regulators in a con-
structive way. That is, if regulators gave Ripple users the actual opportunity
to represent themselves—and potentially regulate themselves like NACHA—
they may have more of an incentive to engage constructively with regulators.
Regulators also have an interest in developing this sort of relationship be-
cause Ripple users are the entities ultimately responsible for, and the only
ones capable of, developing Ripple in socially beneficial ways.
Just as there is precedent for regulators to recognize a self-regulatory
organization’s rulemaking capacities, models exist for coordinating interna-
tional regulation of payment systems.166 Ripple Labs is specifically marketing
Ripple as a solution to the FX markets.167 Because users can operate it from
anywhere, regulators from across the world will have interest in the safety
and soundness of Ripple, in addition to ensuring Ripple’s users comply with
other local laws.
The forums of international regulators that regulate CLS Bank and Soci-
ety for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) present
an ideal approach to regulating DIPPs like Ripple. CLS Bank settles foreign-
exchange transactions, facilitating the conversion of the world’s curren-
cies.168 This gives CLS a particularly significant international dimension.
Considering CLS Bank’s importance in processing transactions in myriad
countries’ currencies, regulators across the globe have a vested interest in the
safety, soundness, and efficiency of an institution responsible for providing
liquidity to local and global currency markets.169 Because of CLS Bank’s im-
portant role in the international financial infrastructure, the Federal Reserve
and other central banks have entered into the Protocol for the Cooperative
Oversight Arrangement of CLS.170 The Federal Reserve, the primary pruden-
tial regulator of the U.S. bank, serves as the Chair of the CLS Oversight
Committee and organizes and administers the forum.171 This forum at-
tempts to reconcile international regulators’ interest in the comprehensive
regulation of CLS with concerns for efficiency by minimizing duplicative
and burdensome regulations of the bank.172 The members of the forum also
166. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 127, at 80–88.
167. See, e.g., Ryan Young, Using Ripple for Cross-Currency Payments, Ripple (Apr. 29,
2015), https://ripple.com/knowledge_center/using-ripple-for-cross-currency-payments/ [http:/
/perma.cc/VN5T-88X5].
168. CPSS on Int’l Payment Systems, supra note 29, at 67, 103.
169. See id.
170. Protocol for the Cooperative Oversight Arrangement of CLS: About, Board Governors
Fed. Res. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/cls_about.htm [http://perma
.cc/2ATC-6C5K] (last updated Sept. 9, 2009).
171. The Financial Stability Oversight Council designated CLS Bank as systemically im-
portant for its role in clearing FX transactions. Designated Financial Market Utilities: About,
Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated
_fmu_about.htm [http://perma.cc/9W58-SAWH] (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).
172. Protocol for the Cooperative Oversight Arrangement of CLS, Board Governors Fed.
Res. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/cls_protocol.htm [http://perma.cc/
RZ6M-YMV5] (last updated May 29, 2009).
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designed it to enhance transparency in communications between the mem-
ber-regulators in developing rules and in communications with CLS.173 Like
with CLS Bank, the National Bank of Belgium oversees a college of regula-
tors that supervises the Belgium-based SWIFT.174
It is in both international regulators’ and Ripple’s best interest to create
an international forum that supervises the protocol. For international regu-
lators, a cooperative forum would provide all regulators with a voice, and
would help to prevent potential races to the bottom and regulatory arbitrage
that could attend inconsistent regulations.175 Regulators could thus ensure
high-quality laws governed Ripple that mitigate the externalities it may pose,
and that Ripple’s users did not just flock to favorable (more weakly regu-
lated) jurisdictions. Furthermore, it will reduce systemic risk by providing a
forum through which regulators from any country could view Ripple’s oper-
ations on an international basis.176
An international forum would reduce the regulatory burden on Ripple
users by minimizing the likelihood that they would have to comply with
duplicative or inconsistent regulations.177 Most significantly, it would allow
Ripple users to represent their interests to global regulators and start a dia-
logue with the bodies that supervise them. The Federal Reserve, as evidenced
by its relationship with NACHA, is open to coordinating regulation of pay-
ment systems with self-regulatory organizations; and as reflected by its regu-
lation of CLS (and participation in the SWIFT forum), it is willing to work
with international bodies in supervising American institutions. Perhaps the
Federal Reserve would even consider cochairing the forum with a Ripple
self-regulatory organization.
Ultimately, an international forum that involves Ripple users is the only
way to ensure that Ripple’s diverse stakeholders participate in its regulation.
Conversely, the only way to ensure effective regulatory involvement in Rip-
ple’s development is through these users’ buy-in. Ripple user buy-in is im-
portant because the only way to promote socially beneficial uses of Ripple’s
platform, such as making it more accessible to the global remittance market,
is through user acceptance of proposed changes. Ripple (and other DIPPs)
presents a truly rare regulatory challenge in that its development and opera-
tion exist on the Internet and outside the control of a single entity. Ripple
user buy-in is more important to successful reform than what regulators
may be accustomed to. Successful regulation may require reconceptualizing
what it means to regulate an entity.
173. Id.
174. Supervision and Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures: Private Sector Systems,
Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/over_pssys
tems.htm [http://perma.cc/56XU-8YGT] (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).
175. See Barr, supra note 133, at 1005, 1010.
176. See Erik Heitfield, Using Trade Repository Data for Systemic Risk Monitoring, 37 IFC
Bull. (Irving Fisher Comm. on Cent. Bank Statistics), Jan. 2014, at 190–91.
177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of analyzing
the burden on a regulated entity in developing “quality” financial regulation).
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C. Principle III: Managing Financial Risks
In addition to the buy-in from users, international regulators should
implement substantive regulations on DIPPs to mitigate potential risks they
may pose. Credit and liquidity risks are among the most important areas of
risk in payment systems, and the key way to control them is through a sys-
tem’s rules and procedures.178 Risk management should cover both normal
situations and abnormal events, such as a participant’s inability to meet its
obligations.179
Payment systems traditionally face credit risk from their participants,
their payment and settlement processes, or both.180 The PFMIs explain that
credit risk mainly derives from extending credit to participants pre-settle-
ment so participants can make transactions and the central settlement insti-
tution can wait until the end of the day to net transactions.181 The methods
to reduce credit risks introduce significant transaction costs: the PFMIs re-
quire participants to post collateral for each trade in addition to always
holding a balance at the settlement institution.182
Ripple does not face credit risk, however, because Ripple is not a central
settlement institution and because it cannot extend intraday credit to its
participants. Settlement is both atomic and immediate because the Ripple
system trades on real assets, not credit, and it facilitates the trades in real
time.183 Because Ripple payments involve the transfers of claims on the gate-
ways in the form of Ripple balances, no market participant (aside from
users) has to hold a balance in any institution.184 Not only is this more effi-
cient because users can put their money to productive uses instead of leaving
it unused as reserve funds, but it is actually safer because the users’ funds are
not subject to the health of the institution that holds them.185 The PFMIs
reflect regulators’ concerns with the safety and soundness of a settlement
institution, whose failure could be disruptive by disabling access to the mar-
ket.186 With Ripple, there is no central settlement institution that could fail.
These two credit risks, then, largely disappear in the move to a DIPP settle-
ment mechanism.
178. See The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 21–24.
179. See id. at 33, 96.
180. Id. at 38.
181. For example, a settlement institution could face credit risk if the value of collateral
posted by a member to cover intraday credit fell below the amount of credit the settlement
institution provided the member. Id. (explaining that credit risk derives from “current expo-
sures from extending intraday credit to participants”).
182. Id. at 39; Galati, supra, note 150, at 55, 62–63.
183. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11–13.
184. See id. at 9, 13–15.
185. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 11–12.
186. See The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 78–87 (explaining Principle 13, requiring financial
market infrastructures to have default management processes in place).
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Payment systems also present special liquidity risks.187 Whether a par-
ticipant making a payment has sufficient funds in its account with the settle-
ment institution so that the system can accept the payment for settlement is
a particularly significant concern for regulators.188 If that institution lacks
sufficient liquidity to make its transactions, or if the central settlement insti-
tution similarly lacks sufficient liquidity to process the transactions, the sys-
tem may come to a halt.189 Frequent gridlock can lead to a loss of confidence
in the payment.190
Ripple, however, presents different liquidity risks than traditional pay-
ment systems. Payments made with Ripple are not likely to lead to liquidity
risks because a bank will not run out of central bank deposits.191 A gateway
need not hold deposits in any third-party institution.192 On the other hand,
cross-border payments on Ripple do generate liquidity risk because there
must be sufficient currency on the buy side for the market maker to facilitate
the payment.193 But each Ripple payment involves an atomic transaction and
straight through path from a payer to a payee, minimizing the risk of
gridlock. If there is not enough liquidity of the currency on the buy side, the
payment does not occur at all.194 However, a lack of liquidity in the underly-
ing assets—for example, a particular currency—could prevent the process-
ing of transactions.195 Ripple mitigates this risk because XRP can bridge
otherwise illiquid currency pairs: if every currency is liquid with respect to
XRP, every currency becomes liquid to every other currency.196
The use of Ripple balances instead of central bank money presents an-
other unusual liquidity risk. Recall that Ripple balances reflect the claims on
gateways rather than a central bank. These claims obviously create more
credit risk than a settlement asset in the form of central bank money, which
is freely redeemable and always liquid.197 A gateway might not be able to
187. Liquidity risk is the risk that a party will not have sufficient funds to meet its finan-
cial obligations to another party as and when expected (even if it may have the funds to make
that obligation later). Id. at 19. Liquidity risks are a particularly significant concern for regula-
tors because they have the potential to pose systemic risks, especially if an asset becomes illiq-
uid, when markets close, or if it creates questions about an entity’s solvency. See id.; Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 341, 345–46 (2011). In-
deed, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission suggests liquidity problems—not general insol-
vency problems—caused Lehman Brother’s collapse and AIG’s bailout during the 2007-08
financial crisis. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra, at 341, 345–46.
188. CPSIPS, supra note 152, at 24.
189. See The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 57–61.
190. See id.
191. Cf. supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
192. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 4.
193. See id. at 12–13.
194. See id. at 11–13.
195. See id. at 15.
196. Id. For example, while there might not be a market to exchange Euros for Won, if
there is a market for XRP to Euros and XRP to Won, then XRP can serve as a bridge currency
that makes the currencies liquid with respect to one another.
197. See Central Bank Money, supra note 13, at 2, 11–13.
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honor its obligation to repay a user the amount in her deposit balance, if, for
example, the gateway became insolvent. The trust lines, however, help users
manage the credit risk between them and their gateway.198 Imprudent use of
these trust lines to unstable gateways may lead to large exposures.199 Regula-
tors should make sure that users fully understand the use of trust lines and
encourage them to be vigilant in minimizing credit risk.
It is important for regulators to ensure that Ripple users acknowledge
that the source of Ripple’s liquidity and credit risks are different from those
of traditional payment systems. Although most of the procedures the CPMI
proposes to mitigate these risks relate to the use of collateral, deposit ac-
counts, and limits on exposures and borrowings from the central bank or
settlement institution, these tactics would do little to account for Ripple’s
risks.200 It might be useful, however, for the Federal Reserve to impose pro-
cedures with respect to cross-border liquidity risks. For instance, it might
request data from Ripple users to note when and how often a payment fails
because of a lack of liquidity. Doing so could help Ripple users and the
Federal Reserve determine which gateways do not hold enough cash to cover
the cross-border payment needs of its depositors, and XRP’s viability as a
liquidity provider. But this sort of socially beneficial behavior from Ripple
users may not otherwise be available without their buy-in.
D. Principle IV: Transparency: Ensure Regulators and Market Participants
Understand the Ripple Protocol
The PFMIs emphasize the importance of ensuring that regulators and
participants have enough information about payment systems to make
sound decisions and have confidence in the system.201 In particular, the
PFMIs explain that payment systems facilitate parties’ understanding of the
risks they pose by providing clear and comprehensive rules, procedures,
market data, and fees.202 The parties must understand the basic design of the
system so that they can determine their rights, obligations, and the potential
risks they may face.203
The Ripple protocol exemplifies transparency at the most basic level be-
cause it is a free, open protocol;204 anyone can view the specific code of the
protocol and the public ledger at any time.205 Regulators should ensure,




200. See, e.g., The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 36–53 (explaining the standard use of collec-
tion of collateral, margin, and position limits to minimize credit and liquidity risks).
201. Id. at 121.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 4.
205. Open-Source, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); Gehring, supra
note 64.
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however, that resources communicate to Ripple users how it works (in di-
gestible ways, such as through the learning resources Ripple Labs currently
provides), in addition to any relevant changes to the protocol that may oc-
cur. Even if Ripple does not impose any legal rules on its members, the
protocol does govern the way that the Ripple-connected computers interact
with each other.206
Traditional regulations do not account for the reality of Ripple owner-
ship. Most rules dictate that the system operator bears the primary responsi-
bility for the provision of this information.207 Because Ripple is not owned
by anyone, transparency depends again on buy-in from Ripple users. Relying
on Principle I, regulators must coordinate with the relevant Ripple self-regu-
latory organization to ensure the free flow of information continues. The
relevant Ripple self-regulatory organization would be the most knowledgea-
ble about the system’s design, and regulators should thus encourage it to
write detailed how-to guides. It should also, as this Note has attempted to
do, explain the theoretical design principles behind the protocol and any
subsequent changes.
E. Principle V: Operational Risk Management of Vital Participants:
Focusing on Nodes, the Consensus Algorithm,
and the Ripple Protocol
A payment system should be designed and operated with a high degree
of security and operational reliability.208 The security of any system is “only
as strong as its weakest link.”209 Thus, regulatory bodies must concern them-
selves not just with the security and operational reliability of the compo-
nents of the central system, but also with components of the system’s
participants.210 This extends beyond the system’s interface and includes op-
erations by participants that could adversely affect the payment system.211
This principle is especially important for payments conducted through Rip-
ple, which relies on a new Internet-based technology for its core operations.
The validating nodes and the consensus process present the most seri-
ous security and operational risks to Ripple users. Remember that each par-
ticipant in the Ripple network chooses a list of validators that settle
transactions based not on a detailed review of the merits of the transaction
but simply on the consensus that the transaction is authentic.212 The integ-
rity of the process depends on the trustworthiness of the validating nodes,
206. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 4; supra note 2 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., CPSIPS, supra note 152, at 21.




212. See The Ripple Protocol, supra note 1, at 11; see also Consensus, Ripple Wiki,
https://wiki.ripple.com/Consensus [http://perma.cc/M4NR-CXM7] (last updated Jan. 6, 2015,
5:39 PM).
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which are not subject to any review.213 Although every honest node’s goal is
to verify good transactions and vote against bad transactions, users may
trust the wrong nodes such that they could compromise the consensus pro-
cess.214 While this risk may be small, systems, in the form of consumer-
protection rules, should ensure that new users know how to avoid making
bad node selections.215
In addition to screening for nodes’ honesty, regulators should run peri-
odic stress tests.216 Stress tests would help identify and eliminate dishonest
nodes, helping regulators and honest users to determine critical points of
failure before the consensus process could fail. The consensus algorithm it-
self should also be subject to repeated stress tests.217 If the algorithm is some-
how faulty or presents greater risk than expected, the network users and
regulators need to adjust their risk-management procedures. Although this
requires the expenditure of public funds and energy, in the post-Dodd-
Frank regulatory world, stress tests are an increasingly important and com-
monly used regulatory tool.218 As discussed in conjunction with Principle II,
the Federal Reserve should take the lead in administering these stress tests
with the assistance of other international regulators and the Ripple self-regu-
latory organization.
In addition to managing the risks nodes pose and the consensus al-
gorithm, regulators must monitor the risk of forks in the Ripple protocol.219
The first risk is that the Ripple protocol develops in unanticipated ways that
could alter the risks it poses (including changes to the consensus algorithm
213. See Schwartz, et al., supra note 68, at 3–5.
214. See id. at 4–7. According to Ripple Labs, the properties of the consensus algorithm
make it difficult for bad nodes to take over the network. See id. Ripple Labs designed the
protocol so that someone could control the network only if enough validating nodes are not
only untrustworthy but collude with each other; because the person who proposes the transac-
tion chooses her unique node list, the ability to screen nodes provides an additional layer of
security. See Consensus, supra note 212.
215. See Schwartz et al., supra note 68, at 4–7.
216. Stress tests are simulations in which regulators test the stability of an institution in
adverse market conditions. See Glossary, supra note 12, at 47 (defining “stress testing” as “the
estimation of credit and liquidity exposures that would result from the realisation of extreme
price and implied volatility scenarios”). These stress tests should also focus on things like
whether Ripple’s defense to Denial of Service attacks—in the form of its XRP transaction
fees—would be sufficient to withstand attacks from well-financed malicious users. See supra
notes 71–84 and accompanying text.
217. Although Ripple Labs provided a mathematical proof that the consensus process is
completely secure, Schwartz et al, supra note 68, at 1–4, regulators should not depend en-
tirely on that analysis and should actually test the system.
218. See, e.g., Stress Tests and Capital Planning: About, Board Governors Fed. Res. Sys.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm [http://perma.cc/
MK98-87AE] (last updated June 25, 2014); Peter Eavis, What to Know About Bank Stress Tests,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/business/deal
book/05db-stress.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W7RX-RYQS] (explaining that stress tests are a
common regulatory device in the post-Dodd-Frank world).
219. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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or settlement process).220 This sort of change could compromise the safety
and soundness of the payment operations conducted through it, potentially
destabilizing the system and risking the safe and secure flow of money
through the global financial system.
The second risk is that users could leave Ripple entirely and use a
“forked” version of the protocol.221 Users have already made several fork
attempts during Ripple’s lifetime.222 Some of these, like Stellar, could be-
come direct competitors to the Ripple protocol.223 While competition might
lead to the development of useful features, it would detract from the net-
work effect that bolsters the soundness of the system. For example, if poten-
tial users leave Ripple to join a fork, there will be fewer potential validating
nodes, which could weaken the consensus process. In addition, fewer users
in the system would decrease liquidity for currency transactions.
In both instances, regulators must monitor developments in the proto-
col, consistent with Principle IV’s focus on transparency. Regulators should
also impose contingency plans in case Ripple forks into an undesirable ver-
sion or too many users leave the network. The PFMIs suggest parties should
use business continuity arrangements to ensure that the agreed-upon service
levels are met even in the event of one or more components of the system
failing.224
Most importantly, regulators should continue to pursue principles-
based approaches to regulating Ripple (and other DIPPs), such as the ap-
proach promoted by this Note. Using a principles-based approach focused
on the buy-in of all stakeholders would ensure that regulators have flexibility
to account for unforeseeable changes. Although traditional payment systems
exist in physical institutions, like CHIPS in the Clearing House Corporation,
DIPPs like Ripple rely on far more flexible and easy to change code-based
protocols. Regulatory approaches must recognize the inherent flexibility of
DIPPs to try to effectively keep up with their development.
F. Principle VI: Risk Management of Ripple Users:
Systemic Risk and AML/KYC
This Note has emphasized a common theme: that Ripple largely plugs
into existing legal frameworks instead of displacing them. Ensuring the
220. See discussion supra Section II.C.
221. See supra note 113.
222. These attempts include NetPay on September 26, 2013, Splash on December 15,
2013, Radix on March 4, 2014, Vpal on March 12, 2014, Stellar on July 31, 2014, and the
TRUST Framework in February 2015. Forks, Ripple Wiki, https://wiki.ripple.com/Forks
[http://perma.cc/F32U-K5BB] (last modified May 10, 2015, 2:03 AM).
223. See Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, Mt. Gox, Ripple Founder Unveils Stellar, a New
Digital Currency Project, Wall St. J.: MoneyBeat (July 31, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/moneybeat/2014/07/31/mt-gox-ripple-founder-unveils-stellar-a-new-digital-currency-
project/ [http://perma.cc/7975-TG54?type=image].
224. The PFMIs, supra note 134, at 34. For example, regulators could ensure that pay-
ments that the protocol would have settled but for a fork occur despite that fork.
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safety and soundness of Ripple, then, requires regulators to ensure the safety
and soundness of the financial institutions and other entities that use Ripple.
Although Ripple may significantly reduce many risks, the entities that use
Ripple still face traditional risks. This Note advocates for the continued reg-
ulation of gateways, both for their safety and soundness and their Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) risks.225 Regu-
lating gateways for their safety and soundness and their AML/KYC risks will
ultimately promote the safety and soundness of the Ripple protocol and en-
courage its adoption.
Cryptocurrencies receive significant attention for their anonymity fea-
tures.226 Like Bitcoin, if users do not tell others that the addresses they use on
Ripple belongs to them, they reveal no personally identifiable informa-
tion.227 This includes when users make trades through gateways. Unless the
sender, receiver, or gateway reveals his identity, Ripple transactions are not
traceable.228 “This allows people to mask their total payments and disassoci-
ate their spending from the general public.”229 It is unsurprising, then, that
Ripple and other DIPPs present KYC and AML risks.
Regulators are cracking down on DIPPs’ noncompliance with AML/
KYC laws.230 In fact, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network assessed a
$700,000 civil money penalty against Ripple Labs for violating the Bank Se-
crecy Act’s AML statute.231 It fined Ripple Labs for “selling its virtual cur-
rency . . . XRP[ ] without registering [it] . . ., and by failing to implement
and maintain an adequate . . . AML[ ] program designed to protect its prod-
ucts from use by money launderers or terrorist financiers.”232
225. In the United States, there are two major anti-money laundering statutes. Protiviti,
Guide to U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Requirements 11 (5th ed. 2012), http://www.pro-
tiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Resource-Guides/Guide-to-US-AML-Requirements-5thEdition-
Protiviti.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8JQ-BA28]. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 establishes reporting
and recordkeeping requirements to prevent the use of secret foreign bank accounts. Id. The
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act) enhances the Bank Secrecy Act’s
scope, and, most significantly, extends AML compliance to nonbank financial institutions. Id.
KYC requirements in the United States refer to the processes financial institutions must com-
ply with to establish the identity of their customers. Id. at 171. These processes are focused on
due diligence and involve compliance with AML rules. Id.
226. See Peter J. Henning, More Bitcoin Regulation Is Inevitable, N.Y. Times: DealBook
(Feb. 3, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/more-bitcoin-regulation-is-
inevitable/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/G2MN-H2VC] (explaining the debate attending Bitcoin’s
anonymity and scandals involving its use in online criminal enterprises).
227. FAQ, supra note 109.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Henning, supra note 226.
231. FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Cur-
rency Exchanger, FinCEN (May 5, 2015), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/html/201505
05.html [http://perma.cc/L8CF-CDHS].
232. Id.
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Regulators will ensure that AML/KYC compliance processes exist. Con-
sidering that Ripple Labs does not own the Ripple protocol and that Ripple
“plugs in” to existing legal frameworks, regulators should focus on whether
gateways have adequate KYC/AML procedures in place. A gateway is where
“fiat money enters and exits the Ripple protocol”: it is at the gateway, not
the protocol itself, where AML/KYC issues exist.233 But the gateways them-
selves may be nontraditional and require regulatory attention they may not
have otherwise received. For example, SnapSwap, Inc., is a popular, nonbank
gateway that may not otherwise deserve regulatory attention but for the
AML/KYC risks it poses.234 Regardless, this Principle maintains that regula-
tors should focus on the regulation of Ripple users—especially gateways—
for both their systemic and AML/KYC risks. Above all, the overarching rule
remains that regulators should use a principles-based approach so they can
account for unforeseen risks, such as a change in the source of AML/KYC
risks.
Conclusion
Ripple reflects a major innovation in payments technology. Unlike other
innovations in recent years that affected operational components on the cus-
tomer interface level, the Ripple protocol has introduced a new distributed
method of settlement that is significantly different from the traditional
model that relies on central institutions. The Ripple protocol offers many
advantages compared to traditional payment systems in terms of safety, effi-
ciency, and cost, especially with respect to the costly and inefficient cross-
border payment system. Because its properties as a DIPP distinguish it from
traditional payment systems and service providers, sound regulation of Rip-
ple requires a flexible and principles-based approach that amends current
regulatory frameworks to account for modern technological realities. Rip-
ple’s advantages suggest that users will increasingly utilize the system in
place of traditional payment processes. But this successful growth, and its
implications for the safety of the global financial system, depends on under-
standing, support, and flexibility from international regulators.
233. See Gehring, supra note 205.
234. See Julian Martinez, Popular Gateways, Ripple (Apr. 26, 2015), https://ripple.com/
knowledge_center/gateway-information/ [http://perma.cc/VT54-98RF]; see also About, Snap-
Swap, https://snapswap.us/#/about [http://perma.cc/RGE5-SLVU]. Other DIPPs, however,
may pose different AML/KYC risks of which regulators must be aware. This explains why a
flexible approach to DIPPs is important: changes to these protocols are relatively easy (com-
pared to changing a physical institution), and so the sources of risk could quickly change.
